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Abstract
A long and lasting problem in agent research has been to close the gap between agent logics and agent programming frameworks.
The main reason for this problem of establishing a link between agent logics and agent programming frameworks is identified and
explained by the fact that agent programming frameworks have hardly incorporated the concept of a declarative goal. Instead, such
frameworks have focused mainly on plans or goals-to-do instead of the end goals to be realised which are also called goals-to-be. In
this paper, the programming language GOAL is introduced which incorporates such declarative goals. The notion of a commitment
strategy—one of the main theoretical insights due to agent logics, which explains the relation between beliefs and goals—is used to
construct a computational semantics for GOAL. Finally, a proof theory for proving properties of GOAL agents is introduced. Thus,
the main contribution of this paper, rather than the language GOAL itself, is that we offer a complete theory of agent programming
in the sense that our theory provides both for a programming framework and a programming logic for such agents. An example
program is proven correct by using this programming logic.
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1. Goal-oriented agent programming
Intelligent agents have not only become one of the central topics of artificial intelligence (nowadays sometimes
even defined as “the study of agents”, [27]), but also mainstream computer science, especially software engineering,
has taken up agent-oriented programming as a new and exciting paradigm to investigate, while industries experiment
with the use of it on a large scale. Although the definition of an agent is subject to controversy, many researchers view
it as a software (or hardware) entity that displays some form of autonomy, in the sense that an agent is both reactive
(responding to its environment) and pro-active (taking initiative, independent of a user). Often this aspect of autonomy
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be achieved [34].
In the early days of agent research, an attempt was made to make the concept of agents more precise by means
of logical systems. This effort resulted in a number of—mainly—modal logics for the specification of agents which
formally defined notions like belief, goal, intention, etc. associated with agents [5,6,18,24]. The relation of these
logics with more practical approaches remains unclear, however, to this day. Several efforts to bridge this gap have
been attempted. In particular, a number of agent programming languages have been developed to bridge the gap
between theory and practice [15,23]. These languages show a clear family resemblance with one of the first agent
programming languages Agent-0 [13,29], and also with the language ConGolog [11,14,17].
These programming languages define agents in terms of their corresponding beliefs, goals, plans and capabilities.
Although they define similar notions as in the logical approaches, there is one notable difference making it hard to
embed those in a verification framework based on such a logic: In logical approaches, a goal is a declarative concept
(also called a goal-to-be), whereas in the cited programming languages goals are defined as sequences of actions or
plans (or goals-to-do). The terminology used differs from case to case. However, whether they are called commit-
ments (Agent-0), intentions (AgentSpeak [23]), or goals (3APL [16]) makes little difference: all these notions are
structures built from actions and therefore similar in nature to plans. With respect to ConGolog, a more traditional
computer science perspective is adopted, and the corresponding structures are simply called programs. The PLACA
language [31], a successor of AGENT0, also focuses more on extending AGENT0 to a language with complex plan-
ning structures (which are not part of the programming language itself!) than on providing a clear theory of declarative
goals of agents as part of a programming language and in this respect is similar to AgentSpeak and 3APL. The type
of goal included in these languages may also be called a goal-to-do and provides for a kind of procedural perspective
on goals.
In contrast, a declarative perspective on goals in agent programming languages is less explored in the literature.
Because of this mismatch it has not been possible so far to use modal logics which include both belief and goal
modalities for the specification and verification of programs written in such agent languages and it has been impossible
to close the gap between agent logics and programming frameworks so far. In this paper, we like to demonstrate how a
verification theory of an agent programming language could look like. To do so, we introduce the agent programming
language GOAL (for Goal-Oriented Agent Language), which takes the declarative concept of a goal seriously and
which provides a concrete proposal to bridge the gap between theory and practice. GOAL is inspired in particular
by the language UNITY designed by Chandy and Misra [4], be it that GOAL incorporates complex agent notions.
Rather than claiming that GOAL is the ultimate and adequate agent programming language, the main purpose for
GOAL in this paper is its use as a vehicle to develop a complete theory of agent programming in the sense that our
theory provides both for a programming framework and a programming logic for such agents. In contrast with other
attempts [29,33] to bridge the gap, our programming language and programming logic are related by means of a
formal semantics. Only by providing such a formal relation it is possible to make sure that statements proven in the
logic concern properties of the agent.
2. The programming language GOAL
In this section, we introduce the programming language GOAL. As mentioned earlier, GOAL is influenced
by work in concurrent programming, in particular by the language UNITY ([4]). The basic idea is that a set of
actions which execute in parallel constitutes a program. However, whereas UNITY is a language based on assign-
ment to variables, the language GOAL is an agent-oriented programming language that incorporates more com-
plex notions such as belief, goal, and agent capabilities which operate on high-level information instead of simple
values.
2.1. Mental states
As in most agent programming languages, GOAL agents select actions on the basis of their current mental state.
A mental state consists of the beliefs and goals of the agent. However, in contrast to most agent languages, GOAL
incorporates a declarative notion of a goal that is used by the agent to decide what to do. Both the beliefs and the
goals are drawn from one and the same logical language, L, with associated consequence relation |=C . In this paper,
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a set At of propositional atoms, and allow the usual propositional connectives ¬,∧,∨,→,↔ to be used to build
complex formulas. Furthermore, we write true as an abbreviation for p ∨ ¬p for some p and false for ¬true. Instead
of false we sometimes also use ⊥ as shorthand. We assume familiar notions such as propositional valuations, truth of
a formula with respect to a valuation, validity of a formula (|= φ for φ ∈ L), and logical entailment Φ |= φ (for Φ ⊆ L
and φ ∈ L) to be known. (They can be found in any textbook on elementary logic.)
In general however, the language L may also be conceived as an arbitrary constraint system, allowing one to
combine tokens (predicates over a given universe) using the operator ∧ (to accumulate pieces of information) and
∃x (to hide information) to represent constraints over the universe of discourse (cf. [28]). In such a setting, one often
assumes the presence of a constraint solver that tests Γ |=C ϕ, i.e., whether information Γ entails ϕ.
Our GOAL-agent thus keeps two databases, respectively called the belief base and the goal base. The difference
between these two databases originates from the different meaning assigned to sentences stored in the belief base
and sentences stored in the goal base. To clarify the interaction between beliefs and goals, one of the more important
problems that needs to be solved is establishing a meaningful relationship between beliefs and goals. This problem is
solved here by imposing a constraint on mental states that is derived from the default commitment strategy that agents
use. The notion of a commitment strategy is explained in more detail below. The constraint imposed on mental states
requires that an agent does not believe that φ is the case if it has a goal to achieve φ, and, moreover, requires φ to be
consistent if φ is a goal.
Definition 2.1 (Mental state). A mental state of an agent is a pair 〈Σ,Γ 〉 where Σ ⊆ L are the agent’s beliefs and
Γ ⊆ L are the agent’s goals (both sets may be infinite) and Σ and Γ are such that:
• Σ is consistent (Σ |=C false),
• Γ is such that, for any γ ∈ Γ :
(i) γ is not entailed by the agent’s beliefs (Σ |=C γ ),
(ii) γ is consistent ( |=C ¬γ ), and
(iii) for any γ ′, if |=C γ → γ ′ and γ ′ satisfies (i) and (ii) above, then γ ′ ∈ Γ .
A mental state does not contain a program or plan component in the ‘classical’ sense. Although both the beliefs
and the goals of an agent are drawn from the same logical language, as we will see below, the formal meaning of
beliefs and goals is very different. This difference in meaning reflects the different features of the beliefs and the goals
of an agent. The declarative goals are best thought of as achievement goals in this paper. That is, these goals describe
a goal state that the agent desires to reach. Mainly due to the temporal features of such goals many properties of
beliefs fail for goals. For example, the fact that an agent has the goal to be at home and the goal to be at the movies
does not allow the conclusion that this agent also has the conjunctive goal to be at home and at the movies at the
same time. As a consequence, less stringent consistency requirements are imposed on goals than on beliefs. An agent
may have the goal to be at home and the goal to be at the movies simultaneously; assuming these two goals cannot
consistently be achieved at the same time does not mean that an agent cannot have adopted both in the language
GOAL.
Note that, strictly speaking, we could have left out the requirement (ii) when formulating item (iii) in Definition 2.1:
If γ ′ is weaker than a consistent formula γ , it must itself be consistent. However, our formulation mirrors the invariant
that we aim the goal set to have: every member must be weaker than ⊥, but not weaker than any belief σ .
In this paper, we assume that the language L used for representing beliefs and goals is a simple propositional
language. As a consequence, we do not discuss the use of variables nor parameter mechanisms. Our motivation for
this assumption is the fact that we want to present our main ideas in their simplest form and do not want to clutter the
definitions below with details. Also, more research is needed to extend the programming language with a parameter
passing mechanism, and to extend the programming logic for GOAL with first order features.
The language L for representing beliefs and goals is extended to a new language LM which enables us to formulate
conditions on the mental state of an agent. The language LM consists of so called mental state formulas. A mental
state formula is a boolean combination of the basic mental state formulas Bφ, which expresses that φ is believed to be
the case, and Gφ, which expresses that φ is a goal of the agent.
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• if φ ∈ L, then Bφ ∈ LM ,
• if φ ∈ L, then Gφ ∈ LM ,
• if ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ LM , then ¬ϕ1, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∈LM .
The usual abbreviations for the propositional operators ∨, →, and ↔ are used.
The semantics of belief conditions Bφ, goal conditions Gφ and mental state formulas is defined in terms of the
classical consequence relation |=C .
Definition 2.3 (Semantics of mental state formulas). Let 〈Σ,Γ 〉 be a mental state.
• 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M Bφ iff Σ |=C φ,
• 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M Gψ iff ψ ∈ Γ ,
• 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M ¬ϕ iff 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M ϕ,
• 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M ϕ1 and 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M ϕ2.
We write |=M ϕ for the fact that mental state formula ϕ is true in all mental states 〈Σ,Γ 〉.
A number of properties of the belief and goal modalities and the relation between these operators are listed in
Tables 1 and 2. Here, C denotes derivability in classical logic, whereas M refers to derivability in the language of
mental state formulas LM .
The first rule (R1) below states that mental state formulas that ‘have the form of a classical tautology’ (like (Bφ ∨
¬Bφ) and Gφ1 → (Bφ2 → Gφ1)), are also derivable in M . By the necessitation rule (R2), an agent believes all
classical tautologies. Then, (A1) expresses that the belief modality distributes over implication. This implies that the
beliefs of an agent are closed under logical consequence. Finally, A2 states that the beliefs of an agent are consistent.
In essence, the belief operator thus satisfies the properties of the system KD (see [10,20]). Although in its current
presentation, our language does not allow for nested (belief-) operators, from [20, Section 1.7] we conclude that we
may assume as if our agent has positive (Bφ → BBφ) and negative (¬Bφ → B¬Bφ) introspective properties: every
formula in the system KD45 (which is KD together with the two mentioned properties) is equivalent to a formula
without nestings of operators.
Axiom A4 below, is a consequence of the constraint on mental states and expresses that if an agent believes φ it
does not have a goal to achieve φ. As a consequence, an agent cannot have a goal to achieve a tautology: ¬Gtrue. An
agent also does not have inconsistent goals (A3), that is, ¬Gfalse is an axiom (see Table 2). Finally, the conditions
that allow to conclude that the agent has a (sub)goal ψ are that the agent has a goal φ that logically entails ψ and that
the agent does not believe that ψ is the case. Axiom A5 below then allows to conclude that Gψ holds. From now on,
for any mental state formula ϕ, M ϕ means that there is a derivation of ϕ using the proof rules R1 and R2 and the
axioms A1–A6. If Δ is a set of mental state formulas from LM , then Δ M ϕ means that there is a derivation of ϕ
using the rules and axioms mentioned, and the formulas of Δ as premises.
Table 1
Properties of beliefs
R1 if ϕ is an instantiation of a classical tautology, then M ϕ
R2 |=C φ ⇒ M Bφ, for φ ∈L
A1 M B(φ → ψ) → (Bφ → Bψ)
A2 M ¬Bfalse
Table 2
Properties of goals
A3 M ¬Gfalse
A4 M Bφ → ¬Gφ
A5 |=C φ → ψ ⇒ M ¬Bψ → (Gφ → Gψ)
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A counter example is provided by the goal base that is generated from {p,p → q}. The consequences of goals are
only computed locally, from individual goals. But even from the goal base {p ∧ (p → q)} one cannot conclude that q
is a goal, since this conclusion is blocked in a mental state in which q is already believed. Deriving only consequences
of goals locally ensures that from the fact that Gφ and Gψ hold, it is not possible to conclude that G(φ ∧ ψ). This
reflects the fact that individual goals cannot be added to a single bigger goal; recall that two individual goals may be
inconsistent (Gφ ∧ G¬φ is satisfiable) in which case taking the conjunction would lead to an inconsistent goal. In
sum, most of the usual problems that many logical operators for motivational attitudes suffer from do not apply to our
G operator (cf. also [21]). On the other hand, the last property of Lemma 2.4 justifies to call G a logical, and not just
a syntactical operator:
Lemma 2.4.
• |=M G(φ → ψ) → (Gφ → Gψ),
• |=M G(φ ∧ (φ → ψ)) → Gψ ,
• |=M (Gφ ∧ Gψ) → G(φ ∧ψ),
• |=C (ϕ ↔ ψ) ⇒ |=M (Gϕ ↔ Gψ).
One finds a similar quest for such weak operators in awareness logics for doxastic and epistemic modalities, see
e.g. [9,30]. As agents do not want all the side-effects of their goals, being limited reasoners they also do not always
adopt all the logical consequences of their belief or knowledge. However, the question remains whether modal logic
is the formal tool to reason with and about goals. Allowing explicitly for mutually inconsistent goals, our treatment of
goals resides in the landscape of paraconsistent logic (cf. [22]). One might even go a step further and explore to use
linear logic [12] to reason about goals, enabling to have the same goal more than once, and to model resource use in
a fine-tuned way: we will not pursue such lines here.
Theorem 2.5 (Soundness and completeness of M ). For any ϕ ∈ LM , we have M ϕ ⇔ |=M ϕ.
Proof. We leave it for the reader to check soundness (i.e., the ‘⇒’-direction). Here, A1 and A2 are immediate con-
sequences of the definition of a belief as a consequence from a given consistent set, A3 follows from condition (ii) of
Definition 2.1, A4 from property (i) and A5 from (iii) of that same definition.
For completeness, assume that M ϕ. Then ¬ϕ is consistent, and we will construct a mental state 〈Σ,Γ 〉 that
verifies ϕ. First, we build a maximal M -consistent set Δ with ¬ϕ ∈ Δ. This Δ can be split in a set Σ and a set Γ as
follows: Σ = {φ | Bφ ∈ Δ} and Γ = {φ | Gφ ∈ Δ}. We now prove two properties of 〈Σ,Γ 〉:
(1) 〈Σ,Γ 〉 is a mental state
(2) 〈Σ,Γ 〉 satisfies the following coincidence property:
for all χ ∈ Lm: 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M χ ⇔ χ ∈ Δ
The proofs for these claims are as follows:
(1) We must show that 〈Σ,Γ 〉 satisfies the properties of Definition 2.1. Obviously, Σ is classically consistent, since
otherwise we would have B⊥ in the M -consistent set Δ, which is prohibited by axiom A2. Also, by axiom
A3, no γ ∈ Γ is equivalent to ⊥. We now show that no γ ∈ Γ is classically entailed by Σ . Suppose that we
would have that σ1, . . . , σn C γ , for certain σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Σ and γ ∈ Γ . Then, by construction of Σ and Γ ,
the formulas Bγ1, . . . ,Bγn,Gγ all are members of the maximal M -consistent set Δ. Since σ1, . . . , σn C γ , by
the deduction theorem for C , R2 and A1 we conclude M (Bσ1, . . . ,Bσn) → Bγ . But this means that both Bγ
and Gγ are members of Δ, which is prohibited by axiom A4. Finally, we show (iii) of Definition 2.1, Suppose
γ ∈ Γ , |=C γ → γ ′ and that γ ′ is consistent, and not classically entailed by Σ . We have to γ ′ ∈ Γ , and this is
immediately guaranteed by axiom A5.
(2) The base case for the second claim is about Bφ and Gφ, with φ ∈ L. We have 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M Bφ iff Σ |=C φ
iff, by definition of Σ , {σ | Bσ ∈ Δ} |=C φ. Using compactness and the deduction theorem for classical logic,
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B((σ1 ∧ · · · ∧ σn) → φ). By A1, this is yields M (Bσ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bσn) → Bφ and, since all the Bσi (i  n) are
members of Δ, we have Bφ ∈ Δ. For the other base case, consider 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M Gφ, which, using the truth-
definition for G, holds iff γ ∈ Γ . By definition of Γ , this means that Gγ ∈ Δ, which was to be proven. The cases
for negation and conjunction follow immediately from this.
2.2. GOAL agents
A third basic concept in GOAL is that of an agent capability. The capabilities of an agent consist of a set of so
called basic actions. The effects of executing such a basic action are reflected in the beliefs of the agent and therefore
a basic action is taken to be a belief update on the agent’s beliefs. A basic action thus is a mental state transformer.
This paper is thus concerned with programming the (change of) mental states of an agent. For this reason we do not
consider possible effects of actions on the external world, and leave this aspect out of the formal semantics as well. (If
one would like, it would not be very hard to incorporate this, but we do not need it for our purposes.) Another thing
that we like to stress is that we take basic actions to be partial mental state transformers in the sense that the result is
not always defined (we then say that the execution of the action is not successful). Formally this will be captured in
the semantics in the next subsection by a semantic functionM that is a partial function.
Two examples of agent capabilities are the actions ins(φ) for inserting φ in the belief base and del(φ) for removing
φ from the belief base. Agent capabilities directly affect the belief base of the agent and not its goals, but because of
the constraints on mental states they may as a side effect modify the current goals. For the purpose of modifying the
goals of the agent, two special actions adopt(φ) and drop(φ) are introduced to respectively adopt a new goal or drop
some old goals. We write Bcap and use it to denote the set of all belief update capabilities of an agent. Bcap thus does
not include the two special actions for goal updating adopt(φ) and drop(φ). The set of all capabilities is then defined
as Cap = Bcap ∪ {adopt(φ),drop(φ) | φ ∈ L}. Individual capabilities are denoted by a.
The set of basic actions or capabilities associated with an agent determines what an agent is able to do. It does not
specify when such a capability should be exercised and when performing a basic action is to the agent’s advantage.
To specify such conditions, the notion of a conditional action is introduced. A conditional action consists of a mental
state condition expressed by a mental state formula and a basic action. The mental state condition of a conditional
action states the conditions that must hold for the action to be selected. Conditional actions are denoted by the symbol
b throughout this paper.
Definition 2.6 (Conditional action). A conditional action is a pair ϕ  do(a) such that ϕ ∈ LM and a ∈ Cap.
Informally, a conditional (‘if-then’) action ϕ  do(a) means that if the mental condition ϕ holds, then the agent
may consider doing basic action a. Of course, if the mental state condition holds in the current state, the action a
can only be successfully executed if the action is enabled, that is, only if the result of the mental state transformer
associated with a is defined. Finally, please note that ϕ do(a) is just syntax, including the keyword ‘do’. We will get
to the semantics of such a conditional action shortly (Definition 2.9).
A GOAL agent consists of a specification of an initial mental state and a set of conditional actions.
Definition 2.7 (GOAL agent). A GOAL agent is a triple 〈Π,Σ0,Γ0〉 where Π is a non-empty set of conditional
actions, and 〈Σ0,Γ0〉 is the initial mental state.
2.3. The operational semantics of GOAL
One of the key ideas in the semantics of GOAL is to incorporate into the semantics a particular commitment
strategy (cf. [5,25]). The semantics is based on a particularly simple and transparent commitment strategy, called blind
commitment.1 An agent that acts according to a blind commitment strategy drops a goal if and only if it believes that
1 We take this simple form of commitment strategy as opposed to other ones mentioned in the literature (such as e.g., single-minded commitment),
since those other strategies involve reasoning about (e.g. beliefs about) future computation, which in general yields a non-computable notion.
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strategy is built into agents. It is, however, only a default strategy and a programmer can overwrite this default strategy
using the drop action in the conditional actions constituting the GOAL agent. It is not possible, however, to adopt a
goal φ in case the agent believes that φ is already achieved.
The semantics of action execution should now be defined in conformance with this basic commitment principle.
Recall that the basic capabilities of an agent were interpreted as belief updates. Because of the default commitment
strategy, there is a relation between beliefs and goals, however, and we should extend the belief update associated
with a capability to a mental state transformer that updates beliefs as well as goals according to the blind commitment
strategy. To get started, we thus assume that some specification of the belief update semantics of all capabilities—
except for the two special actions adopt and drop which only update goals—is given. Our task is, then, to construct a
mental state transformer semantics from this specification for each action. That is, we must specify how a basic action
updates the complete current mental state of an agent starting with a specification of the belief update associated with
the capability only.
From the default blind commitment strategy, we conclude that if a basic action a—different from an adopt or drop
action—is executed, then a goal is dropped only if the agent believes that the goal has been accomplished after doing a.
The revision of goals thus is based on the beliefs of the agent. The beliefs of an agent represent all the information
that is available to an agent to decide whether or not to drop or adopt a goal. So, in case the agent believes that a goal
has been achieved by performing some action, then this goal must be removed from the current goals of the agent.
Besides the default commitment strategy, only the two special actions adopt and drop can result in a change to the
goal base.
The initial specification of the belief updates associated with the capabilities Bcap is formally represented by a
partial function T of type: Bcap×℘(L) → ℘(L). T (a,Σ) returns the result of updating belief base Σ by performing
action a. The fact that T is a partial function represents the fact that an action may not be enabled or executable in
some belief states. The mental state transformer function M is derived from the semantic function T and also is a
partial function. As explained, M(a, 〈Σ,Γ 〉) removes any goals from the goal base Γ that have been achieved by
doing a. The function M also defines the semantics of the two special actions adopt and drop. An adopt(φ) action
adds φ to the goal base if φ is consistent and φ is not believed to be the case. A drop(φ) action removes every goal
that entails φ from the goal base. The idea behind this is the following: if when dropping a formula, say p, we would
not remove stronger formulas as well, we would have that if the goal base contains such a formula (e.g. p ∧ q), the
formula p would still be required to be in the resulting goal base (by Definition 2.1), so that either the goal base would
not satisfy Definition 2.1 or (if we close the goal base under logical consequence) in effect p would not have been
dropped at all! As an example, consider the two extreme cases: drop(false) removes no goals, whereas drop(true)
removes all current goals.
Definition 2.8 (Mental state transformerM). Let 〈Σ,Γ 〉 be a mental state, and T be a partial function that associates
belief updates with agent capabilities. Then the partial functionM is defined by:
M(a, 〈Σ,Γ 〉) =
{ 〈T (a,Σ),Γ \ {ψ ∈ Γ | T (a,Σ) |=C ψ}〉 for a ∈ Bcap, if T (a,Σ) is defined
is undefined for a ∈ Bcap if T (a,Σ) is undefined
M(drop(φ), 〈Σ,Γ 〉) = 〈Σ,Γ \ {ψ ∈ Γ | ψ |=C φ}〉
M(adopt(φ), 〈Σ,Γ 〉) =
{ 〈Σ,Γ ∪ {φ′ | Σ |=M φ′, |=C φ → φ′}〉 if |=C ¬φ and Σ |=C φ
is undefined if Σ |=C φ or |=C ¬φ
The semantic function M maps an agent capability and a mental state to a new mental state. The capabilities of
an agent are thus interpreted as mental state transformers by M. Although it is not allowed to adopt a goal φ that is
inconsistent—an adopt(false) is not enabled—there is no check on the global consistency of the goal base of an agent
built into the semantics. This means that it is allowed to adopt a new goal which is inconsistent with another goal
present in the goal base. For example, if the current goal base Γ contains p, it is legal to execute the action adopt(¬p)
resulting in a new goal base containing p,¬p (if ¬p was not already believed). Although mutually inconsistent goals
cannot be achieved at the same time, they may be achieved in some temporal order. Individual goals in the goal
base, however, are required to be consistent. Thus, whereas local consistency is required (i.e. individual goals must be
consistent), global consistency of the goal base is not required.
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ϕ  do(a) may specify conditions on the beliefs as well as conditions on the goals of an agent. We take conditions
on the beliefs as a precondition for action execution: only if the agent’s current beliefs entail the belief conditions
associated with ϕ the agent will select a for execution. The goal condition, however, is used in a different way. It is
used as a means for the agent to determine whether or not the action will help bring about a particular goal of the
agent. In short, the goal condition specifies where the action is good for. This does not mean that the action necessarily
establishes the goal immediately, but rather may be taken as an indication that the action is helpful in bringing about
a particular state of affairs.
In the definition below, we assume that the action component Π of an agent 〈Π,Σ0,Γ0〉 is fixed. The execution of
an action gives rise to a computation step formally denoted by the transition relation b−→ where b is the conditional
action executed in the computation step. More than one computation step may be possible in a current state and the
step relation −→ thus denotes a possible computation step in a state. A computation step updates the current state and
yields the next state of the computation. Note that because M is a partial function, a conditional action can only be
successfully executed if both the condition is satisfied and the basic action is enabled.
Definition 2.9 (Action selection). Let 〈Σ,Γ 〉 be a mental state and b = ϕ  do(a) ∈ Π . Then, as a rule, we have: If
• the mental condition ϕ holds in 〈Σ,Γ 〉, i.e. 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |= ϕ, and
• a is enabled in 〈Σ,Γ 〉, i.e.M(a, 〈Σ,Γ 〉) is defined,
then 〈Σ,Γ 〉 b−→M(a, 〈Σ,Γ 〉) is a possible computation step. The relation −→ is the smallest relation closed under
this rule.
Now, the semantics of GOAL agents is derived directly from the operational semantics and the computation step
relation −→. The meaning of a GOAL agent consists of a set of so called traces. A trace is an infinite computation
sequence of consecutive mental states interleaved with the actions that are scheduled for execution in each of those
mental states. The fact that a conditional action is scheduled for execution in a trace does not mean that it is also
enabled in the particular state for which it has been scheduled. In case an action is scheduled but not enabled, the
action is simply skipped and the resulting state is the same as the state before. In other words, enabledness is not a
criterion for selection, but rather it decides whether something is happening in a state, once selected.
Definition 2.10 (Trace). A trace s is an infinite sequence s0, b0, s1, b1, s2, . . . such that si is a mental state, bi is a
conditional action, and for every i we have: si
bi−→ si+1, or bi is not enabled in si and si = si+1.
An important assumption in the semantics for GOAL is a fairness assumption. Fairness assumptions concern the
fair selection of actions during the execution of a program. In our case, we make a weak fairness assumption [19].
A trace is weakly fair if it is not the case that an action is always enabled from some point in time on but is never
selected for execution. This weak fairness assumption is built into the semantics by imposing a constraint on traces.
By definition, a fair trace is a trace in which each of the actions is scheduled infinitely often. In a fair trace, there
always will be a future time point at which an action is scheduled (considered for execution) and by this scheduling
policy a fair trace implements the weak fairness assumption. However, note that the fact that an action is scheduled
does not mean that the action also is enabled (and therefore, the selection of the action may result in an idle step which
does not change the state).
The meaning of a GOAL agent is defined as the set of fair traces in which the initial state is the initial mental state
of the agent and in which each step corresponds to the execution of a conditional action or an idle transition.
Definition 2.11 (Meaning of a GOAL agent). The meaning of a GOAL agent 〈Π,Σ0,Γ0〉 is the set of fair traces S
such that for all s ∈ S we have s0 = 〈Σ0,Γ0〉.
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Enabledness
E1 enabled(ϕ  do(a)) ↔ (ϕ ∧ enabled(a)),
E2 enabled(drop(φ)),
R3 |=C ¬φ ⇒ ME ¬Bφ ↔ enabled(adopt(φ)
R4 |=C ¬φ ⇒ ME ¬enabled(adopt(φ))
R5 ME enabled(a) if T (a, ·) is defined (a ∈ Bcap)
2.4. Mental states and enabledness
We formally said that a capability a ∈ Cap is enabled in a mental state 〈Σ,Γ 〉 in case M(a, 〈Σ,Γ 〉) is defined.
This implies that a belief update capability a ∈ Bcap is enabled if T (a,Σ) is defined. Let us assume that this only
depends on the action a—this seems reasonable, since a paradigm like AGM [1] only requires that a revision with ϕ
fails iff ϕ is classically inconsistent, whereas expansions and contractions succeed for all ϕ, hence the question whether
such an operation is enabled does not depend on the current beliefs. A conditional action b is enabled in a mental
state 〈Σ,Γ 〉 if there are Σ ′,Γ ′ such that 〈Σ,Γ 〉 b−→ 〈Σ ′,Γ ′〉. Note that if a capability a is not enabled, a conditional
action ϕ  do(a) is also not enabled. The special predicate enabled is introduced to denote that a capability a or
conditional action b is enabled (denoted by enabled(a) respectively enabled(b)).
The relation between the enabledness of capabilities and conditional actions is stated in Table 3, together with the
fact that drop(φ) is always enabled and a proof rule for deriving enabled(adopt(φ)). Let LME be the language obtained
by Boolean combinations of mental state formulas and enabledness formulas. We denote derivability in the system
for this language by ME . Then, ME consists of the axioms and rules for M , plus Table 3.
Rule R5 enforces that we better write TME given a belief revision function T , but in the sequel we will suppress
this T . The semantics |=ME forLME is based on truth in pairs 〈Σ,Γ 〉,T , where 〈Σ,Γ 〉 is a mental state and T a partial
function for belief updates. For formulas of the format Bϕ and Gϕ, we just use the mental state and Definition 2.3 to
determine their truth. For enabledness formulas, we have the following:
Definition 2.12 (Truth of enabledness).
• 〈Σ,Γ 〉,T |=ME enabled(a) iff T (a,Σ) is defined,
• 〈Σ,Γ 〉,T |=ME enabled(drop(φ)) iff true,
• 〈Σ,Γ 〉,T |=ME enabled(adopt(φ)) iff |=C ¬φ and 〈Σ,Γ 〉,T |=ME ¬Bφ,
• 〈Σ,Γ 〉,T |=ME enabled(ϕ  do(a)) iff 〈Σ,Γ 〉,T |=ME φ and at the same time 〈Σ,Γ 〉,T |=ME enabled(a).
Note that we can summarize this definition to:
• 〈Σ,Γ 〉,T |=ME enabled(a) iffM(a, 〈Σ,Γ 〉) is defined for a ∈ Cap,
• 〈Σ,Γ 〉,T |=ME enabled(b) iff |=ME ϕ and there are Σ ′,Γ ′ with 〈Σ,Γ 〉 b−→ 〈Σ ′,Γ ′〉 for conditional actions
where b = ϕ  do(a).
Theorem 2.13 (Soundness and completeness of ME). We have, for all formulas ϕ in LME,
ME ϕ iff |=ME ϕ
Proof. Again, checking soundness is left to the reader. For the converse, we make a complexity measure explicit for
LME-formulas, along which the induction can proceed. It suffices to stipulate that the complexity of enabled(ψ 
do(a)) is greater than that of Bψ and enabled(a). Furthermore, the complexity of enabled(adopt(φ)) is greater than
that of (¬)Bφ. Now, suppose that ME ϕ, i.e., ¬ϕ is consistent. The language LME is countable, so we can, by
enumeration, extend {¬ϕ} to a maximal ME-consistent set Δ. From this Δ, we distill a pair 〈Σ,Γ 〉,T as follows:
Σ = {ϕ | Bϕ ∈ Δ}, Γ = {ϕ | Gϕ ∈ Δ}, and T (a,Σ) is defined iff enabled(a) ∈ Δ, for any belief capability a. We
claim, for all χ ∈ LME: 〈Σ,Γ 〉,T |= χ iff χ ∈ Δ. For formulas of type Bψ and Gψ this is easily seen. Let us check
it for enabledness formulas.
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• χ = enabled(drop(φ)). By construction of Δ, every enabled(drop(φ)) is an element of Δ (because of axiom E2),
and also, every such formula is true in 〈Σ,Γ 〉,T .
• χ = enabled(adopt(φ)). Suppose 〈Σ,Γ 〉,T |=ME χ . Then, |= ¬φ and hence 〈Σ,Γ 〉,T |=ME Bφ. By the induc-
tion hypothesis, we have that Bφ /∈ Δ, hence ¬Bφ ∈ Δ, and, by R3, enabled(adoptφ)) ∈ Δ. For the converse,
suppose enabled(adopt(φ)) ∈ Δ. Then (by R4), we cannot have that |=C ¬φ. Hence, |=C ¬φ, and by R3, we also
have ¬Bφ ∈ Δ and hence, by applying the induction hypothesis, 〈Σ,Γ 〉,T |=C ¬Bφ. Since R3 is a sound rule,
we finally conclude that 〈Σ,Γ 〉,T |=ME enabled(adopt(φ)).
• χ = enabled(ψ  do(a)). We can write this as ψ ∧ enabled(a) and then use the induction hypothesis. 
3. A personal assistant example
In this section, we give an example to show how the programming language GOAL can be used to program agents.
The example concerns a shopping agent that is able to buy books on the Internet on behalf of the user. The example
provides for a simple illustration of how the programming language works. The agent in our example uses a standard
procedure for buying a book. It first goes to a bookstore, in our case Am.com. At the web site of Am.com it searches
for a particular book, and if the relevant page with the book details shows up, the agent puts the book in its shopping
cart. In case the shopping cart of the agent contains some items, it is allowed to buy the items on behalf of the user.
The idea is that the agent adopts a goal to buy a book if the user instructs it to do so. The set of capabilities Bcap of
the agent is defined by {goto_website(site), search(book),put_in_shopping_cart(book),pay_cart}
The capability goto_website(site) goes to the selected web page site. In our example, relevant web pages are
the home page of the user, the main page of Am.com, web pages with information about books to buy, and a web
page that shows the current items in the shopping cart of the agent. The capability search(book) is an action that
can be selected at the main page of Am.com and selects the web page with information about book. The action
put_in_shopping_cart(book) can be selected on the page concerning book and puts book in the cart; a new web page
called ContentCart shows up showing the content of the cart. Finally, in case the cart is not empty the action pay_cart
can be selected to pay for the books in the cart.
In the program text of Fig. 1, we assume that book is a variable referring to the specifics of the book the user
wants to buy (in the example, we use variables as a means for abbreviation; variables should be thought of as being
instantiated with the relevant arguments in such a way that predicates with variables reduce to propositions). The
Π = {
B(current_website(hpage(user))∨ current_website(ContentCart))
∧ G(bought(book)) do(goto_website(Am.com)),
B(current_website(Am.com))∧ ¬B(in_cart(book))∧
G(bought(book)) do(search(book)),
B(current_website(book))∧ G(bought(book))
 do(put_in_shopping_cart(book)),
B(in_cart(book))∧ G(bought(book)) do(pay_cart)},
Σ0 = {current_webpage(hpage(user)),
∀s, s′((s = s′ ∧ current_webpage(s)) → ¬current_webpage(s′))},
Γ0 = {bought(The Intentional Stance)
∧ bought(Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason)}
GOAL Shopping Agent
Fig. 1. Program for our book buying agent.
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on two different web pages at the same time. We also assume that the user has provided the agent with the goals to
buy The Intentional Stance by Daniel Dennett and Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason by Michael Bratman.
Some of the details of this program will be discussed in the sequel, when we prove some properties of the program.
The agent basically follows the recipe for buying a book outlined above. For now, however, just note that the program
is quite flexible, even though the agent more or less executes a fixed recipe for buying a book. The flexibility results
from the agent’s knowledge state and the non-determinism of the program. In particular, the ordering in which the
actions are performed by the agent—which book to find first, buy a book one at a time or both in the same shopping
cart, etc.—is not determined by the program. The scheduling of these actions thus is not fixed by the program, and
might be fixed arbitrarily on a particular agent architecture used to run the program.
4. Logic for GOAL
On top of the language GOAL and its semantics, we now construct a temporal logic to prove properties of GOAL
agents. The logic is similar to other temporal logics but its semantics is derived from the operational semantics for
GOAL. Moreover, the logic incorporates the belief and goal modalities used in GOAL agents. We first informally
discuss the use of Hoare triples for the specification of actions. In Section 4.3 we give a sound an complete system for
such triples. These Hoare triples play an important role in the programming logic since it can be shown that temporal
properties of agents can be proven by means of proving Hoare triples for actions only. Finally, in Section 4.4 the
language for expressing temporal properties and its semantics is defined and the fact that certain classes of interesting
temporal properties can be reduced to properties of actions, expressed by Hoare triples, is proven.
4.1. Hoare triples
The specification of basic actions provides the basis for the programming logic, and, as we will show below, is all
we need to prove properties of agents. Because they play such an important role in the proof theory of GOAL, the
specification of the basic agent capabilities requires special care. In the proof theory of GOAL, Hoare triples of the
form {ϕ} b {ψ}, where ϕ and ψ are mental state formulas, are used to specify actions. The use of Hoare triples in
a formal treatment of traditional assignments is well-understood [2]. Because the agent capabilities of GOAL agents
are quite different from assignment actions, however, the traditional predicate transformer semantics is not applicable.
GOAL agent capabilities are mental state transformers and, therefore, we require more extensive basic action theories
to formally capture the effects of such actions. Hoare triples are used to specify the postconditions and the frame
conditions of actions. The postconditions of an action specify the effects of an action whereas the frame conditions
specify what is not changed by the action. Axioms for the predicate enabled specify the preconditions of actions.
The formal semantics of a Hoare triple for conditional actions is derived from the semantics of a GOAL agent and
is defined relative to the set of traces SA associated with the GOAL agent A. A Hoare triple for conditional actions
thus expresses a property of an agent and not just a property of an action. The semantics of the basic capabilities are
assumed to be fixed, however, and are not defined relative to an agent.
Definition 4.1 (Semantics of Hoare triples for basic actions). A Hoare triple for basic capabilities {ϕ} a {ψ} means
that for all Σ,Γ
• 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |= ϕ ∧ enabled(a) ⇒ M(a, 〈Σ,Γ 〉) |= ψ , and
• 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |= ϕ ∧ ¬enabled(a) ⇒ 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |= ψ .
To explain this definition, note that we made a case distinction between states in which the basic action is enabled
and in which it is not enabled. In case the action is enabled, the postcondition ψ of the Hoare triple {ϕ} a {ψ}
should be evaluated in the next state resulting from executing action a. In case the action is not enabled, however, the
postcondition should be evaluated in the same state because a failed attempt to execute action a is interpreted as an
idle step in which nothing changes.
Hoare triples for conditional actions are interpreted relative to the set of traces associated with the GOAL agent of
which the action is a part. Below, we write ϕ[si] to denote that a mental state formula ϕ holds in state si .
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actions {ϕ} b {ψ} (for A) means that for all traces s ∈ SA and i, we have that
(ϕ[si] ∧ b = bi ∈ s) ⇒ ψ[si+1]
where bi ∈ s means that action bi is taken in state i of trace s.
Of course, there is a relation between the execution of basic actions and that of conditional actions, and therefore
there also is a relation between the two types of Hoare triples. The following lemma makes this relation precise.
Lemma 4.3. Let A be a GOAL agent and SA be the meaning of A. Suppose that we have {ϕ ∧ ψ} a {ϕ′} and SA |=
(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) → ϕ′. Then we also have {ϕ} ψ  do(a) {ϕ′}.
Proof. We need to prove that (ϕ[si] ∧ (ψ  do(a)) = bi ∈ s) ⇒ ϕ′[si+1]. Therefore, assume (ϕ[si] ∧ (ψ  do(a)) =
bi ∈ s). Two cases need to be distinguished: The case that the condition ψ holds in si and the case that it does not
hold in si . In the former case, because we have {ϕ ∧ ψ} a {ϕ′} we then know that si+1 |= ϕ′. In the latter case, the
conditional action is not executed and si+1 = si . From ((ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) → ϕ′)[si], ϕ[si] and ¬ψ[si] it then follows that
ϕ′[si+1] since ϕ′ is a state formula. 
The definition of Hoare triples presented here formalises a total correctness property. A Hoare triple {ϕ} b {ψ}
ensures that if initially ϕ holds, then an attempt to execute b results in a successor state and in that state ψ holds. This
is different from partial correctness where no claims about the termination of actions and the existence of successor
states are made.
4.2. Basic action theories
A basic action theory specifies the effects of the basic capabilities of an agent. It specifies when an action is
enabled, it specifies the effects of an action and what does not change when an action is executed. Therefore, a basic
action theory consists of axioms for the predicate enabled for each basic capability, Hoare triples that specify the
effects of basic capabilities and Hoare triples that specify frame axioms associated with these capabilities. Since the
belief update capabilities of an agent are not fixed by the language GOAL but are user-defined, the user should specify
the axioms and Hoare triples for belief update capabilities. The special actions for goal updating adopt and drop are
part of GOAL and a set of axioms and Hoare triples for these actions is specified below.
4.2.1. Actions on beliefs: capabilities of the shopping assistant
Because in this paper, our concern is not with the specification of basic action theories in particular, but with
providing a programming framework for agents in which such specifications can be plugged in, we only provide
some example specifications of the capabilities defined in the personal assistant example that we need in the proof of
correctness below.
First, we specify a set of axioms for each of our basic actions that state when that action is enabled. Below, we
abbreviate the book titles of the example, and write T for The Intentional Stance and I for Intentions, Plans, and
Practical Reason. In the shopping agent example, we then have:
enabled(goto_website(site)) ↔ true,
enabled(search(book)) ↔ B(current_website(Am.com)),
enabled(put_in_shopping_cart(book)) ↔ B(current_website(book)),
enabled(pay_cart) ↔ ((Bin_cart(T )∨ Bin_cart(I ))∧ Bcurrent_website(ContentCart)).
Second, we list a number of effect axioms that specify the effects of a capability in particular situations defined by
the preconditions of the Hoare triple.
• The action goto_website(site) results in moving to the relevant web page:
{true} goto_website(site) {Bcurrent_website(site)}
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{Bcurrent_website(Am.com)} search(book) {Bcurrent_website(book)}
• On the page with information about a particular book, selecting the action put_in_shopping_cart(book) results in
the book being put in the cart; also, a new web page appears on which the contents of the cart are listed:
{Bcurrent_website(book)}
put_in_shopping_cart(book)
{B(in_cart(book)∧ current_website(ContentCart))}
• In case book is in the cart, and the current web page presents a list of all the books in the cart, the action pay_cart
may be selected resulting in the buying of all listed books:
{B(in_cart(book)∧ current_website(ContentCart))}
pay_cart
{¬Bin_cart(book)∧ B(bought(book)∧ current_website(Am.com))}
Finally, we need a number of frame axioms that specify which properties are not changed by each of the capabilities
of the agent. For example, both the capabilities goto_website(site) and search(book) do not change any beliefs about
in_cart. Thus we have, e.g.:
{Bin_cart(book)} goto_website(site) {Bin_cart(book)}
{Bin_cart(book)} search(book) {Bin_cart(book)}
It will be clear that we need more frame axioms than these two, and some of these will be specified below in the proof
of the correctness of the shopping agent.
It is important to realise that the only Hoare triples that need to be specified for agent capabilities are Hoare triples
that concern the effects upon the beliefs of the agent. Changes and persistence of (some) goals due to executing
actions can be derived with the proof rules and axioms below that are specifically designed to reason about the effects
of actions on goals.
4.2.2. Actions on goals
A theory of the belief update capabilities and their effects on the beliefs of an agent must be complemented with
a theory about the effects of actions upon the goals of an agent. Such a theory should capture both the effects of the
default commitment strategy as well as give a formal specification of the drop and adopt actions. Only in Section 4.3
we aim at providing a complete system, in the discussion in the current section, some dependencies between axioms
and rules are discussed.
Default commitment strategy The default commitment strategy imposes a constraint on the persistence of goals.
A goal persists if it is not the case that after doing a the goal is believed to be achieved. Only action drop(φ) is
allowed to overrule this constraint. Therefore, in case a = drop(φ), we have that {Gφ} a {Bφ ∨ Gφ} (using the rule for
conditional actions from Table 9, one can derive that this triple also holds for general conditional actions b, rather than
just actions a). The Hoare triple precisely captures the default commitment strategy and states that after executing an
action the agent either believes it has achieved φ or it still has the goal φ if φ was a goal initially. (See Table 4.)
A similar Hoare triple can be given for the persistence of the absence of a goal. Formally, we have
(1){¬Gφ} b {¬Bφ ∨ ¬Gφ}
Table 4
Persistence of goals
a = drop(φ)
{Gφ} a {Bφ ∨ Gφ}
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Infeasible actions
ϕ → ¬enabled(a)
{ϕ} a {ϕ}
Table 6
Frame properties on beliefs for adopt and drop
{Bφ} adopt(ψ) {Bφ} {¬Bφ} adopt(ψ) {¬Bφ}
{Bφ} drop(ψ) {Bφ} {¬Bφ} drop(ψ) {¬Bφ}
Table 7
(Non-)effects of adopt
Effects of adopt
|=C ¬φ
{¬Bφ} adopt(φ) {Gφ}
Non-effect of adopt
{Gψ} adopt(φ) {Gψ} |=C ψ → φ{¬Gφ} adopt(ψ) {¬Gφ}
Table 8
(Non-)effects of drop
Effects of drop
|=C ψ → φ
{Gψ} drop(φ) {¬Gψ}
Non-effects of drop
{¬Gφ} drop(ψ) {¬Gφ} {¬G(φ ∧ψ)∧ Gφ} drop(ψ) {Gφ}
This Hoare triple states that the absence of a goal φ persists, and in case it does not persist the agent does not believe
φ (anymore). The adoption of a goal may be the result of executing an adopt action, of course. However, it may also
be the case that an agent believed it achieved φ but after doing b no longer believes this to be the case and adopts φ as
a goal again. For example, if the goal base is {p ∧ q} and the belief base Σ = {p}, then the agent does not have a goal
to achieve p because it already believes p to be the case; however, in case an action changes the belief base such that
p is no longer is believed, the agent has a goal to achieve p (again). This provides for a mechanism similar to that of
maintenance goals. We do not need the Hoare triple (1) as an axiom, however, since it is a direct consequence of the
fact that Bφ → ¬Gφ (this is exactly the postcondition of (1)). Note that the stronger {¬Gφ} b {¬Gφ} does not hold,
even if b = ϕ  do(adopt(φ)). This occurs for example if we have G(p ∧ q)∧ Bp. Then the agent does not have p as
a goal, since he believes it has already been achieved, but, if he would give up p as a belief, it becomes to be a goal.
In the semantics of Hoare triples (Definition 4.2) we stipulated that if a is not enabled, we verify the postcondition
in the same state as the pre-condition: see Table 5.
Frame properties on Beliefs The specification of the special actions drop and adopt involves a number of frame
axioms and a number of proof rules. The frame axioms capture the fact that neither of these actions has any effect
on the beliefs of an agent. Note that, combining such properties with e.g. the Consequence Rule (Table 10) one can
derive the triple {Bψ} adopt(φ) {¬Gψ}.
(Non-)effects of adopt The proof rules for the actions adopt and drop capture the effects on the goals of an agent. For
each action, we list proof rules for the effect and the persistence (‘non-effect’) on the goal base for adoption (Table 7)
and dropping (Table 8) of goals, respectively.
An agent adopts a new goal φ in case the agent does not believe φ and φ is not a contradiction. Concerning
persistence, an adopt action does not remove any current goals of the agent. Any existing goals thus persist when
adopt is executed. The persistence of the absence of goals is somewhat more complicated in the case of an adopt
action. An adopt(φ) action does not add a new goal ψ in case ψ is not entailed by φ or ψ is believed to be the case:
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Rule for conditional actions
{ϕ ∧ψ} a {ϕ′}, (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) → ϕ′
{ϕ} ψ  do(a) {ϕ′}
Table 10
Structural rules
Consequence Rule: Conjunction Rule:
ϕ′ → ϕ, {ϕ} a {ψ},ψ → ψ ′
{ϕ′} a {ψ ′}
{ϕ1} b {ψ1}, {ϕ2} b {ψ2}
{ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2} b {ψ1 ∧ψ2}
Disjunction Rule:
{ϕ1} b {ψ}, {ϕ2} b {ψ}
{ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2} b {ψ}
A drop action drop(φ) results in the removal of all goals that entail φ. This is captured by the first proof rule in
Table 8.
Concerning persistence of goals under drop: a drop action drop(φ) never results in the adoption of new goals. The
absence of a goal ψ thus persists when a drop action is executed. It is more difficult to formalise the persistence of a
goal with respect to a drop action. Since a drop action drop(φ) removes goals which entail φ, to conclude that a goal
ψ persists after executing the action, we must make sure that the goal does not depend on a goal (is a subgoal) that is
removed by the drop action. In case the conjunction φ ∧ψ is not a goal, we know this for certain.
The basic action theories for GOAL include a number of proof rules to derive Hoare triples. The Rule for Infeasible
Actions (Table 5) allows to derive frame axioms for an action in case it is not enabled in a particular situation. The
Rule for Conditional Actions allows the derivation of Hoare triples for conditional actions from Hoare triples for ca-
pabilities. This rule is justified by Lemma 4.3. There are three rules for combining Hoare triples and for strengthening
the precondition and weakening the postcondition: they are displayed in Table 10.
Finally, we list how one goes from simple actions a to conditional actions b (Table 9), and how to use complex
formulas in pre- and post-conditions (Table 10).
We did not aim in this section at giving a weakest set of rules: in fact, the rules that manipulate the pre- and
post-conditions in Table 10 for conditional actions b could already be derived if we had only given them for simple
actions a.
4.3. A complete Hoare system
We now address the issue of finding a complete Hoare system for GOAL. Let H {ρ} S {σ } denote that the Hoare
triple with pre-condition ρ and postcondition σ is derivable in the calculus H that we are about to introduce, and let
|=H denote the truth of such assertions, that is, |=H determines the truth of mental state formulas (Definition 2.3),
that of formulas with enabled(−) (Definition 2.12) and that of Hoare triples (Definition 4.1), on mental states 〈Σ,Γ 〉.
From now on, the statement S ranges over basic actions a and conditional actions b. Then, this subsection wants to
settle whether our calculus H is sound and complete, i.e. whether it can be proven that, for any pre- and postcondition
ρ and σ ∈ LM ,
H {ρ} S {σ } ⇐⇒ |=H {ρ} S {σ }
Finding such a complete system is, even for ‘ordinary deterministic programs’, impossible, since such programs
are interpreted over domains that include the integers, and by Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem, we know that it is
impossible to axiomatize a domain that includes those integers (cf. [3]). Here, our domain is not that of the integers,
but, instead, we will assume a completeness result for the basic capabilities Bcap that modify the belief base, so that
we can concentrate on the actions that modify the goals.
Definition 4.4 (General substitutions). We define the following general substitution scheme. Let σ,α,β be mental
state formulas, and X a variable ranging over formulas from L. Then β(X) denotes that X may occur in β . Let C(X)
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For instance, the result of (Gp ∧ ¬Gq ∧ Gs)[Br/Gφ | C (p ∧ q) → φ] is Br ∧ ¬Br ∧ Gs.
Definition 4.5 (The system H). The valid Hoare triples for GOAL are as follows:
BELIEF CAPABILITIES
{ρ(a)} a {σ(a)} iff Definition 4.1 applies, i.e., iff |=H {ρ(a)} a {σ(a)}
ADOPT
{(enabled(adopt(φ))∧ σ [¬Bφ′/Gφ′ | C φ → φ′])∨ (¬enabled(adopt(φ))∧ σ)}{adopt(φ)}{σ }
DROP
{σ [true/¬Gφ′ | C φ′ → φ]} drop(φ) {σ }
CONDITIONAL ACTIONS
{ρ ∧ψ} a {σ }, |=ME (ρ ∧ ¬ψ) → σ
{ρ} ψ  do(a) {σ }
CONSEQUENCE RULE
|=ME ρ → ϕ, {ϕ} a {ψ}, |=ME ψ → σ
{ρ} a {σ }
Lemma 4.6 (Substitution Lemma).
(i) Let 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M enabled(adopt(φ)) and let 〈Σ ′,Γ ′〉 =M(adopt(φ), 〈Σ,Γ 〉). Then:
〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M σ [¬Bφ′/Gφ′ | C φ → φ′] ⇐⇒ 〈Σ ′,Γ ′〉 |=M σ
(ii) Let 〈Σ ′,Γ ′〉 =M(drop(φ), 〈Σ,Γ 〉). Then:
〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M σ [true/¬Gφ′ | C φ′ → φ] ⇐⇒ 〈Σ ′,Γ ′〉 |=M σ
Proof. We only prove (i), the proof of (ii) is similar. We prove (i) by induction on the mental state formula σ .
(1) σ is of the form Gχ . We distinguish two cases.
(a) C φ → χ . By definition of M(adopt(φ), 〈Σ,Γ 〉), we immediately see that 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M ¬Bχ iff
〈Σ ′,Γ ′〉 |=M Gχ .
(b) C φ → χ . The definition of M(adopt(φ), 〈Σ,Γ 〉) guarantees that the adopt has no effect on the fact that
χ is a goal, thus we have 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=H Gχ iff M(adopt(φ), 〈Σ,Γ 〉) |=H Gχ . Also, the substitution has no
change as an effect: (Gχ)[¬Bφ′/Gφ′ | C χ → φ′] = Gχ , and we have the desired result.
(2) σ if of the form Bχ . In this case, the substitution had no effect, and also, since the adopt has no effect on the
belief base, we have that 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M Bχ iff 〈Σ ′,Γ ′〉 |=M Bχ .
(3) The cases that σ is a negation or a conjunction of mental states, follows immediately. 
Lemma 4.7 (Soundness of H ). For any pre- and postcondition ρ and σ ∈ LM , H {ρ} S {σ } ⇒ |=H {ρ} S {σ }.
Proof. Soundness of BELIEF CAPABILITIES is assumed; our framework builds upon a given belief revision policy.
The cases for adopt and drop immediately follow from Lemma 4.6. The soundness of CONSEQUENCE RULE is
easily proven using Theorem 2.5. Let us finally consider the rule CONDITIONAL ACTIONS. Suppose that |=H {ρ ∧
ψ} a {σ } (1), and |=ME (ρ ∧ ¬ψ) → σ (2), and take an arbitrary mental state 〈Σ,Γ 〉. We have to demonstrate
that |=H {ρ} ψ  do(a) {σ } (3). Hence, assume that 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=ME ρ. We then distinguish two cases. First, assume
〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=ME ψ . Then, by our assumption (1), we have that 〈Σ ′,Γ ′〉 |=M σ , for 〈Σ ′,Γ ′〉 =M(a, 〈Σ,Γ 〉). The second
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|=M ψ , i.e., 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M ¬ψ . By (2), we know that 〈Σ ′,Γ ′〉 |=ME σ , for any 〈Σ ′,Γ ′〉
for which 〈Σ,Γ 〉 b−→ 〈Σ ′,Γ ′〉. All in all, we have proven (3). 
We first introduce the notion of weakest liberal precondition, originally due to Dijkstra [8]. However, we introduce
it immediately in the syntax.
Definition 4.8 (Weakest Liberal Precondition). For S = a′,adopt(φ)drop(φ) and ψ  do(a) (a′ a belief capability, a
any basic capability), we define the weakest liberal precondition for S to achieve σ , wlp(S, σ ) ∈ Lm, as follows:
(1) If a′ is a belief capability, and H {σ−1(a′)} a′ {σ(a′)} is the rule for a′, then wlp(a′, σ (a′)) = σ−1,
(2) wlp(adopt(φ), σ ) = (enabled(adopt(φ))∧ σ [¬Bφ′/Gφ′ | C φ → φ′)∨ (¬enabled(adopt(φ))∧ σ),
(3) wlp(drop(φ), σ ) = σ [true/¬Gφ′ | C φ′ → φ],
(4) wlp(ψ  do(a), σ ) = (ψ ∧ wlp(a, σ ))∨ (¬ψ ∧ σ).
Note that the weakest precondition wlp(S, σ ) is indeed a mental state formula.
Lemma 4.9 (Weakest Precondition Lemma). We have: H {wlp(S, σ )} S {σ }, for every S and every postcondition σ .
Proof. For S = a′,adopt(φ),drop(φ), this follows immediately from Definition 4.5. For conditional actions b =
ψ  do(a), we have to prove
H {(ψ ∧ wlp(a, σ ))∨ (¬ψ ∧ σ)} ψ  do(a) {σ }
Let us abbreviate (ψ ∧wlp(a, σ ))∨ (¬ψ ∧σ) to σ−1b . The induction hypothesis tells us that H {wlp(a, σ )} a {σ } (1).
Note that |=M σ−1b → wlp(a, σ ). Hence, by the CONSEQUENCE RULE and (1), we have H {σ−1b } a {σ } (2). Obvi-
ously, we also have |=M (σ−1b ∧¬ψ) → σ (3). Applying the CONDITIONAL ACTIONS rule to (2) and (3), we conclude
H {σ−1b } ψ  do(a) {σ }, which was to be proven. 
Lemma 4.10. |=H {ρ} S {σ } ⇒|=M ρ → wlp(S, σ ).
Proof. We even prove a stronger statement, i.e., that for all mental states 〈Σ,Γ 〉, if |=H {ρ} S {σ }, then 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M
ρ → wlp(S, σ ). To prove this, we take an arbitrary 〈Σ,Γ 〉 for which 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M ρ and we have to show that
〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M wlp(S, σ ).
(1) S = adopt(φ). We know that 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=H {ρ} adopt(φ) {σ }. We distinguish two cases, the first of which says
that 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M ¬enabled(adopt(φ)). Then we have a transition from 〈Σ,Γ 〉 to itself, and hence 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M
σ , and hence 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M ¬enabled(adopt(φ)) ∧ σ , so that 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M wlp(adopt(φ), σ ). In the second case,
〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M enabled(adopt(φ)). By the Substitution Lemma 4.6, case (i), we then immediately see 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M
σ [¬Bφ′/Gφ′ | C φ → φ′], and hence 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M wlp(adopt(φ,σ )).
(2) S = drop(φ). This case follows immediately from the Substitution Lemma and the definition of wlp(drop(φ,σ )).
(3) S = ψ  do(a). We know that 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=H {ρ} ψ  do(a) {σ } and that 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M ρ. If 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M ¬ψ , then
the transition belonging to S ends up in 〈Σ,Γ 〉, and hence we then have 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M ¬ψ ∧ σ , and in particular
〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M wlp(S, σ ). In the other case we have 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M ψ , and we know that |=H {ρ} a {σ }. By induction
we conclude that 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M wlp(a, σ ), and hence 〈Σ,Γ 〉 |=M wlp(ψ  do(a)), σ ). 
Theorem 4.11 (Completeness of H ). For any pre- and postcondition ρ and σ ∈ LM ,
H {ρ} S {σ } ⇐⇒ |=H {ρ} S {σ }
Proof. Suppose |=M {ρ} S {σ }. The Weakest Precondition Lemma 4.9 tells us that H {wlp(S, σ )} S {σ } (1). By
Lemma 4.10, we have |=M σ → wlp(S, σ ) (2). We finally apply the CONSEQUENCE RULE to (1) and (2) to conclude
to conclude that H {ρ} S {σ }. 
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On top of the Hoare triples for specifying actions, a temporal logic is used to specify and verify properties of GOAL
agents. Two new operators are introduced. The proposition init states that the agent is at the beginning of execution
and nothing has happened yet. The second operator until is a weak until operator. ϕ until ψ means that ψ eventually
becomes true and ϕ is true until ψ becomes true, or ψ never becomes true and ϕ remains true forever.
Definition 4.12 (Language of temporal logic LT based on L). The temporal logic language LT is inductively defined
by:
• init ∈ LT ,
• enabled(a), enabled(ϕ  do(a)) ∈ LT for a ∈ Cap,
• if φ ∈ L, then Bφ,Gφ ∈ LT ,
• if ϕ,ψ ∈ LT , then ¬ϕ,ϕ ∧ψ ∈ LT ,
• if ϕ,ψ ∈ LT , then ϕ until ψ ∈ LT .
A number of other well known temporal operators can be defined in terms of the operator until. The always
operator ϕ is an abbreviation for ϕ until false, and the eventuality operator ϕ is defined as ¬¬ϕ as usual.
Temporal formulas are evaluated with respect to a trace s and a time point i. State formulas like Bφ, Gψ , enabled(a)
etc. are evaluated with respect to mental states.
Definition 4.13 (Semantics of temporal formulas). Let s be a trace and i be a natural number.
• s, i |= init iff i = 0,
• s, i |= enabled(a) iff enabled(a)[si],
• s, i |= enabled(ϕ  do(a)) iff enabled(ϕ  do(a))[si ],
• s, i |= Bφ iff Bφ[si],
• s, i |= Gφ iff Gφ[si],
• s, i |= ¬ϕ iff s, i |= ϕ,
• s, i |= ϕ ∧ψ iff s, i |= ϕ and s, i |= ψ ,
• s, i |= ϕ until ψ iff ∃j  i(s, j |= ψ ∧ ∀k(i  k < j (s, k |= ϕ))) or ∀k  i(s, k |= ϕ).
We are particularly interested in temporal formulas that are valid with respect to the set of traces SA associated
with a GOAL agent A. Temporal formulas valid with respect to SA express properties of the agent A.
Definition 4.14. Let S be a set of traces.
• S |= ϕ iff ∀s ∈ S, i(s, i |= ϕ),
• |= ϕ iff S |= ϕ where S is the set of all traces.
In general, two important types of temporal properties can be distinguished. Temporal properties are divided into
liveness and safety properties. Liveness properties concern the progress that a program makes and express that a
(good) state eventually will be reached. Safety properties, on the other hand, express that some (bad) state will never
be entered. In the rest of this section, we discuss a number of specific liveness and safety properties of an agent
A = 〈ΠA,Σ0,Γ0〉.
We show that each of the properties that we discuss are equivalent to a set of Hoare triples. The importance of this
result is that it shows that temporal properties of agents can be proven by inspection of the program text only. The
fact that proofs of agent properties can be constructed by inspection of the program text means that there is no need to
reason about individual traces of an agent or its operational behaviour. In general, reasoning about the program text is
more economical since the number of traces associated with a program is exponential in the size of the program.
The first property we discuss concerns a safety property, and is expressed by the temporal formula ϕ → (ϕ until ψ).
Properties in this context always refer to agent properties and are evaluated with respect to the set of traces associated
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then it remains true until ψ becomes true. By definition, we write this property as ϕ unless ψ :
ϕ unless ψ df= ϕ → (ϕ until ψ)
An important special case of an unless property is ϕ unless false, which expresses that if ϕ ever becomes true, it
will remain true. ϕ unless false means that ϕ is a stable property of the agent. In case we also have init → ϕ, where
init denotes the initial starting point of execution, ϕ is always true and is an invariant of the program.
Now we show that unless properties of an agent A = 〈Π,σ0, γ0〉 are equivalent to a set of Hoare triples for basic
actions in Π . This shows that we can prove unless properties by proving a finite set of Hoare triples. The proof relies
on the fact that if we can prove that after executing any action from Π either ϕ persists or ψ becomes true, we can
conclude that ϕ unless ψ .
Theorem 4.15. Let A = 〈ΠA,Σ0,Γ0〉. Then:
∀b ∈ ΠA({ϕ ∧ ¬ψ} b {ϕ ∨ψ}) iff SA |= ϕ unless ψ
Proof. The proof from right to left is the easiest direction in the proof. Suppose SA |= ϕ unless ψ and s, i |= ϕ. This
implies that s, i |= ϕ until ψ . In case we also have s, i |= ψ , we are done. So, assume s, i |= ¬ψ and action b is
selected in the trace at state si . From the semantics of until we then know that ϕ ∨ ψ holds at state si+1, and we
immediately obtain {ϕ∧¬ψ} b {ϕ∨ψ} since s and i were arbitrarily chosen trace and time point. To prove the Hoare
triple for the other actions in the agent program A, note that when we replace action b with another action c from ΠA
in trace s, the new trace s′ is still a valid trace that is in the set SA. Because we have SA |= ϕ unless ψ , we also have
s′, i |= ϕ unless ψ and from reasoning by analogy we obtain the Hoare triple for action c (and similarly for all other
actions).
We prove the left to right case by contraposition. Suppose that
(*) ∀b ∈ ΠA({ϕ ∧ ¬ψ} b {ϕ ∨ψ})
and for some s ∈ SA we have s, i |= ϕ unless ψ . The latter fact means that we have s, i |= ϕ and s, i |= ϕ until ψ .
s, i |= ϕ until ψ implies that either (i) ψ is never established at some j  i but we do have ¬ϕ at some time point
k > i or (ii) ψ is established at some time j > i, but in between i and any such j it is not always the case that ϕ holds.
In the first case (i), let k > i be the smallest k such that s, k |= ϕ. Then, we have s, k − 1 |= ϕ ∧ ¬ψ and s, k |=
¬ϕ∧¬ψ . In state sk−1, however, either a conditional action is performed or no action is performed. From (*) we then
derive a contradiction.
In the second case (ii), let k > i be the smallest k such that s, k |= ψ . Then we know that there is a smallest j such
that i < j < k and s, j |= ϕ (j = i since s, i |= ϕ). This means that we have s, j − 1 |= ϕ ∧ ¬ψ . However, in state sj
either a conditional action is performed or no action is performed. From (*) we then again derive a contradiction. 
Liveness properties involve eventualities which state that some state will be reached starting from a particular
situation. To express a special class of such properties, we introduce the operator ϕ ensures ψ . ϕ ensures ψ informally
means that ϕ guarantees the realisation of ψ , and is defined as:
ϕ ensures ψ
df= ϕ unless ψ ∧ (ϕ → ψ)
ϕ ensures ψ thus ensures that ψ is eventually realised starting in a situation in which ϕ holds, and requires that ϕ
holds until ψ is realised. For the class of ensures properties, we can show that these properties can be proven by
proving a set of Hoare triples. The proof of a ensures property thus can be reduced to the proof of a set of Hoare
triples.
Theorem 4.16. Let A = 〈ΠA,σ0, γ0〉. Then:
∀b ∈ ΠA({ϕ ∧ ¬ψ} b {ϕ ∨ψ})∧ ∃b ∈ ΠA({ϕ ∧ ¬ψ} b {ψ}) ⇒ SA |= ϕ ensures ψ
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by Theorem 4.15 we only need to prove that SA |= ϕ → ψ given that ∀b ∈ ΠA({ϕ ∧ ¬ψ} b {ϕ ∨ ψ}) ∧ ∃b ∈
ΠA({ϕ ∧¬ψ} b {ψ}). Now suppose, to arrive at a contradiction, that for some time point i and trace s ∈ SA we have:
s, i |= ϕ ∧ ¬ψ and assume that for all later points j > i we have s, j |= ¬ψ . In that case, we know that for all j > i
we have s, j |= ϕ ∧ ¬ψ (because we may assume ϕ unless ψ ). However, we also know that there is an action b that
is enabled in a state in which ϕ ∧ ¬ψ holds and transforms this state to a state in which ψ holds. The action b thus is
always enabled, but apparently never taken. This is forbidden by weak fairness, and we arrive at a contradiction. 
Finally, we introduce a third temporal operator ‘leads to’ →. The operator ϕ → ψ differs from ensures in that it
does not require ϕ to remain true until ψ is established, and is derived from the ensures operator. → is defined as the
transitive, disjunctive closure of ensures.
Definition 4.17 (Leads to operator). The leads to operator → is defined by:
ϕ ensures ψ
ϕ →ψ
ϕ →χ,χ →ψ
ϕ →ψ
ϕ1 →ψ,...,ϕn →ψ
(ϕ1∨···∨ϕn)→ψ
The meaning of the ‘leads to’ operator is captured by the following lemma. ϕ → ψ means that given ϕ condition
ψ will eventually be realised. The proof of the lemma is an easy induction on the definition of →.
Lemma 4.18. ϕ → ψ |= ϕ → ψ .
5. Proving agents correct
In this section, we use the programming logic to prove the correctness of our example shopping agent. We do not
present all the details, but provide enough details to illustrate the use of the programming logic. Before we discuss
what it means that an agent program is correct and provide a proof which shows that our example agent is correct, we
introduce some notation. The notation involves a number of abbreviations concerning names and propositions in the
language of our example agent:
• Instead of current_website(sitename) we just write sitename; e.g., we write Am.com and ContentCart instead
of current_website(Am.com) and current_website (ContentCart), respectively.
• As before, the book titles The Intentional Stance and Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason that the agent
intends to buy are abbreviated to T and I respectively. These conventions can result in formulas like B(T ),
which means that the agent is at the web page concerning the book The Intentional Stance.
A simple and intuitive correctness property, which is natural in this context and is applicable to our example
agent, states that a GOAL agent is correct when the agent program realises the initial goals of the agent.2 For this
subclass of correctness properties, we may consider the agent to be finished upon establishing the initial goals and in
that case the agent could be terminated. Of course, it is also possible to continue the execution of such agents. This
class of correctness properties can be expressed by means of temporal formulas like Gφ → ¬Gφ. Other correctness
properties are conceivable, of course, but not all of them can be expressed easily in the temporal proof logic for GOAL.
5.1. Correctness property of the shopping agent
From the discussion above, we conclude that the interesting property to prove for our example program is the
following property:
Bcond ∧ G(bought(T )∧ bought(I )) → B(bought(T )∧ bought(I ))
2 An even more precise notion would also require that the agent’s goal base becomes empty, i.e., that the agent does not also generate new goals
on the fly, that remain unfulfilled. The proof for that property would be similar, in this context.
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Bcurrent_webpage(hpage(user))∧ ¬Bin_cart(T )∧ ¬Bin_cart(I )∧
B(∀s, s′((s = s′ ∧ current_webpage(s)) → ¬current_webpage(s′)))
The correctness property states that the goal to buy the books The Intentional Stance and Intentions, Plans and
Practical Reason, given some initial conditions on the beliefs of the agent, leads to buying (or believing to have
bought) these books. Note that this property expresses a total correctness property. It states both that the program
behaves as desired and that it will eventually reach the desired goal state. An extra reason for considering this property
to express correctness of our example agent is that the goals involved once they are achieved remain true forever (they
are ‘stable’ properties).
5.2. Invariants and frame axioms
To be able to prove correctness, we need a number of frame axioms. There is a close relation between frame
axioms and invariants of a program. This is because frame axioms express properties that are not changed by actions,
and a property that, once true, remains true whatever action is performed is a stable property. In case such a property
also holds initially, the property is an invariant of the program. In our example program, there is one invariant that
states that it is impossible to be at two web pages at the same time: inv = B∀s, s′((s = s′ ∧ current_webpage(s)) →
¬current_webpage(s′)).
To prove that inv is an invariant of the agent, we need frame axioms stating that when inv holds before the execution
of an action it still holds after executing that action. Formally, for each a ∈ Cap, we need: {inv} a {inv}. These frame
axioms need to be specified by the user, and for our example agent we assume that they are indeed true. By means of
the Consequence Rule (strengthen the precondition of the Hoare triples for capabilities a) and the Rule for Conditional
Actions (instantiate ϕ and ϕ′ with inv), we then obtain that {inv} b {inv} for all b ∈ Π . By Theorem 4.15, we then
know that inv unless false. Because we also have that initially inv holds since 〈σ0, γ0〉 |= inv, we may conclude that
init → Binv∧ inv unless false. inv thus is an invariant and holds at all times during the execution of the agent. Because
of this fact, we do not mention inv explicitly anymore in the proofs below, but will freely use the property when we
need it.
A second property that is stable is the property status(book):
status(book) df= (Bin_cart(book)∧ Gbought(book))∨ Bbought(book)
The fact that status(book) is stable means that once a book is in the cart and it is a goal to buy the book, it remains in
the cart and is only removed from the cart when it is bought.
The proof obligations to prove that status(book) is a stable property, i.e. to prove that status(book) unless false,
consist of supplying proofs for
{status(book)} b {status(book)}
for each conditional action b ∈ Π of the shopping agent (cf. Theorem 4.15). By the Rule for Conditional Actions,
therefore, it is sufficient to prove for each conditional action ψ  do(a) ∈ Π that {status(book)∧ψ} a {status(book)}
and (status(book)∧¬ψ) → status(book). The latter implication is trivial. Moreover, it is clear that to prove the Hoare
triples it is sufficient to prove {status(book)} a {status(book)} since we can strengthen the precondition by means of the
Consequence Rule. The proof obligations thus reduce to proving {status(book)} a {status(book)} for each capability
of the shopping agent.
Again, we cannot prove these Hoare triples without a number of frame axioms. Because no capability is allowed
to reverse the fact that a book has been bought, for each capability, we can specify a frame axiom for the predicate
bought:
(1) {Bbought(book)} a {Bbought(book)}
In case the book is not yet bought, selecting action pay_cart may change the contents of the cart and therefore we first
treat the other three actions goto_website, search, and put_in_shopping_cart which are not supposed to change the
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{Bin_cart(book)∧ ¬Bbought(book)} a {Bin_cart(book)∧ ¬Bbought(book)}
where a = pay_cart. Note that these frame axioms do not refer to goals but only refer to the beliefs of the agent, in
agreement with our claim that only Hoare triples for belief updates need to be specified by the user. By using the
axiom Gbought(book) → ¬Bbought(book) and the Consequence Rule, however, we can conclude that:
{Bin_cart(book)∧ Gbought(book)} a {Bin_cart(book)∧ ¬Bbought(book)}
By combining this with the axiom
{Gbought(book)} a {Bbought(book)∨ Gbought(book)}
by means of the Conjunction Rule and by rewriting the postcondition with the Consequence Rule, we then obtain
(2) {Bin_cart(book)∧ Gbought(book)} a {Bin_cart(book)∧ Gbought(book)}
where a = pay_cart. By weakening the postconditions of (1) and (2) by means of the Consequence Rule and com-
bining the result with the Disjunction Rule, it is then possible to conclude that {status(book)} a {status(book)} for
a = pay_cart.
As before, in the case of capability pay_cart we deal with each of the disjuncts of status(book) in turn. The second
disjunct can be handled as before, but the first disjunct is more involved this time because pay_cart can change both the
content of the cart and the goal to buy a book if it is enabled. Note that pay_cart only is enabled in case BContentCart
holds. In case BContentCart holds and pay_cart is enabled, from the effect axiom for pay_cart and the Consequence
Rule we obtain
(3)
{Bin_cart(book)∧ Gbought(book)∧ BContentCart}
pay_cart
{Bbought(book)}
In case ¬BContentCart holds and pay_cart is not enabled, we use the Rule for Infeasible Capabilities to conclude that
(4)
{Bin_cart(book)∧ Gbought(book)∧ ¬BContentCart}
pay_cart
{Bin_cart(book)∧ Gbought(book)∧ ¬BContentCart}
By means of the Consequence Rule and the Disjunction Rule, we then can conclude from (1), (3) and (4) that
{status(book)} pay_cart {status(book)}, and we are done.
5.3. Proof outline
The main proof steps to prove our agent example correct are listed next. The proof steps below consists of a number
of ensures formulas which together prove that the program reaches its goal in a finite number of steps.
(1) Bhpage(user)∧ ¬Bin_cart(T )∧ Gbought(T )∧
∧¬Bin_cart(I )∧ Gbought(I )
ensures
BAm.com ∧ ¬Bin_cart(T )∧ Gbought(T )∧ ¬Bin_cart(I )∧ Gbought(I )
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ensures
[(B(T )∧ Gbought(T )∧ ¬Bin_cart(I )∧ Gbought(I ))∨
(B(I )∧ Gbought(I )∧ ¬Bin_cart(T )∧ Gbought(T ))]
(3) B(T )∧ Gbought(T )∧ ¬Bin_cart(I )∧ Gbought(I )
ensures
Bin_cart(T )∧ Gbought(T )∧ ¬Bin_cart(I )∧ Gbought(I )∧ BContentCart
(4) Bin_cart(T )∧ Gbought(T )∧ ¬Bin_cart(I )∧ Gbought(I )
ensures
BAm.com ∧ ¬Bin_cart(I )∧ Gbought(I )∧ status(T )
(5) B(Am.com)∧ ¬Bin_cart(I )∧ Gbought(I )∧ status(T )
ensures
B(I )∧ Gbought(I )∧ status(T )
(6) B(I )∧ Gbought(I )∧ status(T )
ensures
Bin_cart(I )∧ Gbought(I )∧ BContentCart ∧ status(T )
(7) Bin_cart(I )∧ Gbought(I )∧ BContentCart ∧ status(T )
ensures
Bbought(T )∧ Bbought(I )
At step 3, the proof is split up into two subproofs, one for each of the disjuncts of the disjunct that is ensured in
step 2. The proof for the other disjunct is completely analogous. By applying the rules for the ‘leads to’ operator the
third to seventh step result in:
(a) B(T )∧ Gbought(T )∧ ¬Bin_cart(I )∧ Gbought(I ) →
Bbought(T )∧ Bbought(I )
(b) B(I)∧ Gbought(I )∧ ¬Bin_cart(T )∧ Gbought(T ) →
Bbought(T )∧ Bbought(I )
Combining (a) and (b) by the disjunction rule for the ‘leads to’ operator and by using the transitivity of ‘leads to’ we
then obtain the desired correctness result:
Bcond ∧ G(bought(T )∧ bought(I )) → B(bought(T )∧ bought(I ))
with Bcond as defined previously.
Step 1. We now discuss the first proof step in somewhat more detail. The remainder of the proof is left to the
reader. The proof of a formula ϕ ensures ψ requires that we show that every action b in the Personal Assistant
program satisfies the Hoare triple {ϕ ∧¬ψ} b {ϕ ∨ψ} and that there is at least one action b′ which satisfies the Hoare
triple {ϕ ∧ ¬ψ} b′ {ψ}. By inspection of the program, in our case the proof obligations turn out to be:
{Bhpage(user)∧ ¬Bin_cart(T )∧ Gbought(T )∧ ¬Bin_cart(I )∧ Gbought(I )}
b
{Bhpage(user)∧ ¬Bin_cart(T )∧ Gbought(T )∧ ¬Bin_cart(I )∧ Gbought(I )}
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B(Am.com)∧ ¬B(in_cart(book))∧ G(bought(book)) do(search(book)),
B(book)∧ G(bought(book)) do(put_in_shopping_cart(book)),
B(in_cart(book))∧ G(bought(book)) do(pay_cart)}
and
{Bhpage(user)∧ ¬Bin_cart(T )∧ Gbought(T )∧ ¬Bin_cart(I )∧ Gbought(I )}
B(hpage(user)∨ ContentCart)∧ G(bought(book)) do(goto_website(Am.com))
{BAm.com ∧ ¬Bin_cart(T )∧ Gbought(T )∧ ¬Bin_cart(I )∧ Gbought(I )}
The proofs of the first three Hoare triples are derived by using the Rule for Conditional Actions. The key point is
noticing that each of the conditions of the conditional actions involved refers to a web page different from the web
page hpage(user) referred to in the precondition of the Hoare triple. The proof thus consists of using the fact that
initially Bhpage(user) and the invariant inv to derive an inconsistency which immediately yield the desired Hoare
triples by means of the Rule for Conditional Actions.
To prove the Hoare triple for
B(hpage(user)∨ ContentCart)∧ G(bought(book)) do(goto_website(Am.com))
we use the effect axiom (5) for goto_website and the frame axiom (6):
(5)
{Bhpage(user)}
goto_website(Am.com)
{BAm.com}
and
(6)
{¬Bin_cart(book)∧ ¬Bbought(book)}
goto_website(Am.com)
{¬Bin_cart(book)∧ ¬Bbought(book)}
By using the axiom
{Gbought(book)} goto_website(Am.com) {Bbought(book)∨ Gbought(book)}
the Conjunction Rule and the Rule for Conditional Actions it is then not difficult to obtain the desired conclusion.
6. Conclusion
In the literature several approaches to the design and implementation of agents have been proposed. One such
approach promotes the use of agent logics for the specification of agent systems and aims at a further refinement of
such specifications by means of an associated design methodology for the particular logic in use to implementations
which meet this specification in, for example, an object-oriented programming language like Java. In this approach,
there is no requirement on the existence of a natural mapping relating the end result of this development process—a
Java implementation—and the formal specification in the logic. It is, however, not very clear how to implement these
ideas for agent logics incorporating both informational and motivational attitudes.
Another approach consists in the construction of agent architectures which ‘implement’ the different mental con-
cepts. Such an architecture provides a template which can be instantiated with the relevant beliefs, goals, etc. Although
this second approach is more practical than the first one, our main problem with this approach is that the architectures
proposed so far tend to be quite complex. As a consequence, it is quite difficult to understand what behaviour an
architecture that is instantiated will generate.
Besides these approaches, there is the approach of devising dedicated agent-oriented programming (AOP) lan-
guages employing mental notions, so that these notions can be directly used in the implementation of agents. We
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reflecting in a natural way the intentional concepts used to design agents. Having AOP languages available also pro-
vides the opportunity to devise a theory of agent programming along the lines of a theory of traditional programming,
incorporating formal semantics of these languages and a proof theory for the correctness of (agent) programs.
For these reasons, our own research concerning intelligent agents has focused on the programming language 3APL.
However, if one takes the AOP paradigm seriously, one should incorporate all notions that are deemed relevant in
agent theories/logics, including that of a declarative goal. As we have indicated in Section 1, in most AOP languages
(including the original version of our own 3APL) this is not the case.
It has been our aim in this paper to show that it is feasible to incorporate declarative goals into a programming
framework (and there is no need to dismiss the concept). Moreover, our semantics is a computational semantics and
it is rather straightforward to implement the language, although this may require some restrictions on the logical
reasoning involved on the part of GOAL agents.
It is an interesting question how the ideas of GOAL as a language with declarative goals could be combined with
those of 3APL (in which there are only procedural goals, or plans, as they are called in recent work). For instance, we
could imagine to extend the guards appearing in the plan revision rules of 3APL, which are conditions on the beliefs,
to conditions that also include conditions on the goals. In [7,26,35] we have proposed to extend 3APL with declarative
goals in another way, viz. by introducing (besides plan revision rules) so-called plan-generating rules, which are very
similar to the rules in GOAL, and which can be used to select plans on the basis of belief and goal conditions. At the
moment work is being done on the implementation of this extended version of 3APL.
In the present paper, we provided a complete programming theory. The theory includes a concrete proposal for a
programming language and a formal, operational semantics for this language as well as a corresponding proof theory
based on temporal logic. The logic enables reasoning about the dynamics of agents and about the beliefs and goals of
the agent at any particular state during its execution. The semantics of the logic is provided by the GOAL program
semantics which guarantees that properties proven in the logic are properties of a GOAL program. By providing
such a formal relation between an agent programming language and an agent logic, we were able to bridge the gap
between theory and practice. Moreover, a lot of work has already been done in providing practical verification tools
for temporal proof theories [32].
It would be interesting to investigate how our programming theory can be extended to the above-mentioned latest
version of 3APL in which both declarative goals—inspired by the language GOAL—and procedural goals have been
incorporated and integrated. This is non-trivial since the way of reasoning about procedural goals (plans) is quite
different from that of reasoning about declarative ones, and would probably call for a substantial increase in express-
ibility of the verification logic. We leave this here as future research. Our work in this paper thus only shows promising
initial steps to agent verification in general.
Finally, our work shows that the (re)use of ideas and techniques from concurrent programming can be very fruitful.
In particular, we have used many ideas from concurrent programming and temporal logics for programs in developing
GOAL. It remains fruitful to explore and exploit ideas and techniques from these areas.
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